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Foreign direct investment in Tunisia:
Performance, policies, prospects1
Around the turn of the millennium, Tunisia achieved sizeable rates of economic growth. Given
the additional fact of an increasing financial deepening and an emerging industry, the country
had been considered by many observers as one of the ‘African Lions.’ However, even before the
Arab Spring movements started in Tunisia, the average growth rate was still far from the rate re-
quired for a fast catch-up with high income economies. This article aims at analysing the role
which foreign direct investment (FDI) has played and can play in spurring economic growth in
Tunisia. It analyses domestic saving and investment aswell as presents patterns of FDI and present
promotional policies. The author argues that foreign direct investment can help to overcome
some constraints in capital accumulation and even contribute to ‘inclusive growth,’ i.e., a region-
ally, socially, and inter-generationally balanced growth pattern. There are, however, two precon-
ditions: capital inflows must be directed by appropriate promotional policies and Tunisia must
insulate itself from any negative repercussions from the present political unrest in theMiddle East
and North African region.
Inwestycje zagraniczne w Tunezji
– realizacje, zasady postêpowania, perspektywy
Naprze³omie tysi¹cleci Tunezja osi¹gnê³awysokiwskaŸnik tempawzrostu gospodarczego. Zwa-
¿ywszy dodatkowo na rozwój rynku finansowego oraz dynamicznie wzrastaj¹cy przemys³, kraj
ten uwa¿any jest przez wielu obserwatorów za jeden z afrykañskich „tygrysów gospodarczych”.
Jednak¿e jeszcze przed wydarzeniami Arabskiej Wiosny, maj¹cymi swój pocz¹tek w Tunezji,
œrednia stopa wzrostu by³a nadal daleka od wartoœci wymaganych, by dorównaæ gospodarkom
wysokodochodowym.Niniejszy artyku³ma na celu analizê roli, jak¹ odgrywaj¹ imog¹ odgrywaæ
inwestycje zagraniczne podczas gwa³townego wzrostu gospodarczego w Tunezji. Artyku³ ten
bada zarówno oszczêdnoœci i inwestycje krajowe, jak te¿ obecne wzorce inwestycji zagranicz-
nych oraz prezentuje politykê promocyjn¹. Dowodzi on, ¿e inwestycje zagraniczne mog¹ pomóc
przezwyciê¿yæ pewne ograniczenia w akumulacji kapita³u, a nawet przyczyniæ siê do trwa³ego
„wzrostu sprzyjaj¹cego w³¹czeniu spo³ecznemu”, tj. zrównowa¿onego regionalnie, spo³ecznie
i miêdzypokoleniowo modelu wzrostu. Istniej¹ jednak dwa warunki wstêpne: nap³yw kapita³u
musi byæ kierowany przez odpowiedni¹ politykê promocyjn¹, a Tunezja musi chroniæ siê przed
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comments on a first draft of this article. The author is also grateful for the financing of a Fact Finding
Mission to Tunisia in 2014 by Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), grant 57155876.
jakimikolwiek negatywnymi nastêpstwami obecnych niepokojów politycznych w regionie Bliskie-
go Wschodu i Afryki Pó³nocnej.
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Introduction
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) is investment from foreign sources intended
‘to acquire a lasting management interest’ in a company in the host country
[World Bank, 2014a]. FDI can offer a number of advantages for economies aspiring
to an economic catch-up, such as Tunisia. Thus, since the 1990s virtually all newly
industrialising and developing economies have not only liberalised their capital
markets but have also tried to attract direct investment by a variety of incentives.
On the other hand, global competition has increasingly forced companies to shift
existing production, to establish additional production lines abroad to avoid disa-
dvantages in the home country, such as increasing labour costs, or to exploit ad-
vantages in serving external markets from within a host country rather than by
exports [Dunning, 1990].
As a result of the increasing demand for and supply of capital in the formof di-
rect investment, in recent years the global market for this type of capital flows has
become more competitive on both sides. Authorities of locations in high demand
by foreign investors, such as China, could become more selective in what kind of
foreign investment to promote in order to best fill the gaps in the internal econo-
mic fabric. On the other hand, given the world-wide interest of countries to host
foreign investment, transnational companies (TNCs) have an increasing number
of options to optimise their choices on where to set up new production sites in or-
der to optimise their value adding chains. Entry conditions usually depend on the
respective bargaining powers of the TNC and the host government [Fagre, Wells,
1982].
This article aims at analysing Tunisia’s stance towards FDI and the promotio-
nal policies used to improve its bargaining power. It will start in its first section
with an overview on the past performance to attract FDI.
1. Performance
Tunisia looks back on a fifty-year history of integration into the world econo-
my. Following short-lived experiments with an inward-looking development
strategy immediately after independence in the 1960s, this choice had suggested
itself. Given the small size of the internal market, the scope for the diversification
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of national production was limited and substantial foreign trade imperative. In
2008, export of goods and services (especially tourism) had reached a high of 56%
of GDP. Since then, however, the share has declined – as a result of the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis, the Eurozone Crisis, and the Arab Spring movement (which had
started in Tunis in December 2010) [World Bank, 2014a].
The opening-up to FDI as a part of an outward-looking development strategy
became relevant in the 1990s (see Figure 1). For many years, international obser-
vers deemed Tunisia’s political system to be stable – as well as business-friendly,
even if nepotistic. Investors’ confidence declined dramatically during the Arab
Spring and has not yet risen to pre-crisis level.
Given the historical relationship and the geographical proximity, it is not sur-
prising that France is the most important country of origin of FDI (38%), followed
by Italy (25%) and Germany (8%) [FIPA, 2014]. Presently, more than 3,000 foreign-
funded or joint capital companies are operational in Tunisia, generating about one
third of the country’s exports and providing about one fifth of total employment
[US DoS, 2014].
Tunisia has rather leniently regulated foreign business activity, which is re-
flected in its high ranking in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business Index
[World Bank, 2014b]. Theworkforce includes a large share of semi-skilled and skil-
led labour based on a lower secondary school completion rate of nearly 80%. On
the other hand, the high unemployment leads to lowwages. Both factors combine
to low unit labour costs. In addition, due to its closeness to the European Union,
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Figure 1. Net inflows of FDI (new inflows less disinvestment), Tunisia, 1990 to 2015
Source: [World Bank, 2014a].
the country is considered well serving as an export platform to one of the world’s
largest unified markets.
From 2007 to 2013 Tunisia’s energy sector received the bulk of FDI inflows
(56%), while manufacturing received 24%, services 19% and agricultural less than
1%. The most important subsectors in manufacturing were the chemical and rub-
ber industry and the electrical and electronics industry [FIPA, 2014]. As shown in
Table 1, in terms of employment-generation by FDI, the most important sector is
textiles and clothing, followed by the electric and electronic industry.
Some foreign investment in Tunisia resulted from the recent privatisation of
state-owned enterprises, especially in infrastructure (such as acquisition of shares
of telecommunication operator Tunisiana byQatar Telecom) but also in other sub-
sectors such as banking (e.g. the acquisition of BT shares by French Crédit Mutu-
el). Large foreign investments in the energy sector include British Gas, which de-
veloped Miskar offshore gas field. Turkish TAV constructed the Enfidha Interna-
tional Airport, predominantly serving the tourism industry. Further large-scale
investments include those by Alcatel and Siemens in telecommunications, Sanofi
Aventis and Pfizer in pharmaceuticals, Nestlé in food processing, Toyota and Pi-
relli in automotive and Zodiac Aerospace in aircraft industry [US DoS, 2014].
Table 1. Foreign-funded companies per sector and their employment, Tunisia, 2013
(Sub-)Sector Companies Employment
Manufacturing industries 2,496 282,859
o/w textiles and clothing 1,096 123,179
o/w electric and electronic 272 70,013
o/w mechanical, metallurgy 329 19,871
o/w leather and footwear 143 19,416
o/w agri-business 166 14,323
Services 438 32,583
o/w call centres 50 14,078
o/w telecommunications 7 10,021
Agriculture 80 2,539
Tourism 148 15,968
o/w lodging 94 14,965
Total 3,162 333,949
Source: [FIPA, 2014].
Foreign-funded enterprises in Tunisia usually produce labour-intensive and
mainly low-end components. Zodiac, for instance, produces airplane interiors
and electrical installation. Some authors believe that foreign-funded enterprises
have low propensity to innovate [Kriaa, Karray, 2010; El Elj, 2012]. This holds true
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even in high-tech industries. For instance, Sanofis’smain activity (under the name
Winthrop) is a laboratory for generic medicaments. A further point of concern for
Tunisian policy makers is the high concentration of FDI in the Greater Tunis
region and theNorth East andCentral East regions – about one third in each of the
three regions in terms of employment created by foreign funded enterprises –
while the remaining parts of the country are seldom targeted [FIPA, 2014].
When comparing Tunisia with its most important competitor as a host coun-
try for FDI in the North African region, Morocco, three observations stand out.
First, while Tunisia’s share in the world’s total stocks has declined over the past
two decades, Morocco’s share has increased (Figure 2). Secondly, the relative im-
portance of FDI stocks in the economy (inward stocks of FDI as a percentage of
GDP) has heavily increased in Morocco since the turn of the millennium, while
there is small change in Tunisia (Figure 3). Finally, inflows of FDI to Tunisia have
been heavily affected by the political and economic turbulences since 2009, while
Morocco had arguably been perceived as a more stable environment for foreign
investment.
2. The rationale for a FDI-backed catch-up in Tunisia
Given the present difficulties to attract FDI, the Tunisian government would
be well advised to increase its promotional endeavours as well as to readjust the
targeting. Themost important reasons are: first, FDI can contribute to bridging the
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Figure 2. Changes in the share of FDI stocks in the world’s total: developing countries
in general and Tunisia and Morocco in particular, 1990 to 2012, Index 1990: 100
Source: Computed with data from: [UNCTAD, 2014].
gap betweendomestic saving rates and the investment rateswhich are required to
sustain economic growth; secondly, FDI, if well directed, can improve the quality
of growth.
2.1. Supplementing domestic savings and increasing capital formation
During the first years of the new millennium, a number of African countries
achieved considerable attention for their economic performance. Egypt, Morocco,
Tunisia and South Africa were not only regarded as being able to sooner or later
catch up with upper middle and high income countries but were also accredited
as potential growth engines for the African region and beyond. In the consultancy
industry, the term ‘African Lions’ was coined for these economies in analogy to
the ‘East Asian Tigers,’ which ‘leaped forward’ in the 1970s [McKinsey Global In-
stitute, 2010].
Despite this flattery, it is apparent that Tunisia’s average annual growth rate
over the past decade has been far from the double-digit growth rates which South
Korea and China achieved during their catch-up period [World Bank, 1993]. To-
day, the GDP per capita in Tunisia amounts to US$ 9,900 (Purchasing Power Pari-
ty, 2013 estimates), hence the World Bank classification of Tunisia as an Upper
Middle Income Country. Assuming future annual growth rates equal to their pre-
vious ten year average, it would take Tunisia 60 years to catch up with the EU
average (US$ 34,240; 1.3% average growth rate 2000–2009). Thus, in view of the
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Figure 3. FDI Stocks as Percentage of GDP, Tunisia and Morocco, 1990 to 2012
Source: Computed with data from: [UNCTAD, 2014].
prevailing high unemployment and the rapid population growth, spurring eco-
nomic growth becomes imperative.
An iron law of economics holds that in order to grow, economies must save
and subsequently invest a certain proportion of their gross national income. The
more an economy can save and invest, the faster it can grow. In other words: cru-
cial to any catching-up process is the readiness of the present generation to forgo
(large) parts of their consumption possibilities and increase savings and invest-
ments. However, the actual growth rate for any level of saving and investment is
determined by the economy’s capital productivity. The classical formulation of
this law is the Harrod–Domar equation: gY = s/k, with gY being the growth rate of
GDP, s the savings ratio and k the capital-to-output ratio, hence 1/k being capital
productivity.
As a matter of fact, the present investment rates of Tunisia compare unfavour-
ably with those of the fast catching-up economies of East Asia. In the first decade
of the new millennium, Tunisia’s gross capital formation hovered around 25% of
GDP (see Table 2). Moreover, even in comparison with the ‘average’ lower and
upper middle income country, domestic saving rates in Tunisia have been rather
low (see Table 3). In contrast, Korea’s domestic saving and investment rates have
amounted to over 30% of GDP since the mid-1980s, and China’s saving and invest-
ment rates have even exceeded 40% since the mid-1990s.
Table 2. Capital formation, domestic savings and selected forms of capital imports
in Tunisia, 1990–2012
Indicator Time period Percentage of GDP
Gross capital formation
1990–1999 26.0
2000–2009 24.3
2010–2012 25.1
Gross domestic savings
1990–1999 21.8
2000–2009 21.6
2010–2012 18.1
Personal remittances received
1990–1999 3.6
2000–2009 4.4
2010–2012 4.7
Foreign direct investment, net inflows
1990–1999 2.0
2000–2009 3.8
2010–2012 2.5
Source: Computed with data from: [World Bank, 2014a].
Admittedly, from the point of view of standard economic theory, a divergence
between the national saving rate and the national investment should not be of
40 Hans-Heinrich Bass
concern today. Rather, domestic saving rates should be expected to be uncorrelat-
ed with domestic investment rates. The reason is that under the assumption of
perfect capital mobility, savers would invest where it is most profitable, which is
not necessarily in their home country. Borrowers, on the other hand, would not
need the funds from domestic savers if they could borrow from international mar-
kets at world rates [Feldstein, Horioka, 1980]. Ultimately, this would lead to an in-
ternational equalisation of capital returns.
In real world economics, however, this effect has not transpired in spite of the
deregulation of the global financial markets. Obstfeld and Rogoff [2000] consid-
ered this contradiction as one of the ‘sixmajor puzzles’ in international economics.
A hands-on reason for this paradox may be that market distortion is still being cre-
ated by governments via institutional barriers against capital outflows or by their
incentives to invest at home. A more profound explanation is provided by the
New Growth Theory [Romer, 1993]. This theory argues that human capital has
neutral or even positive returns to scale and increasing rather than decreasing
marginal returns. Thus, clustering of human capital (and complementary physical
capital) in high-growth and high-profit areas and sectors becomes more plausible
in modern, innovation-based economies than an equal dispersion of investment.
As a consequence, newly industrialising economies should increase both their in-
vestment rates and their domestic saving rates to spur economic growth.
Domestic savings and capital formation can be raised by a variety of public
policies, including interest rate policies and the institutional development of the
financial system of a country (which is called ‘financial deepening’ by: [Shaw,
1973]). Financial deepening as an instrument for economic development increases
the provision of financial services with a wider choice of options available to all
kinds of producers and consumers. It allows the mobilisation of domestic savings
including those from poorer strata of society and from rural areas, channelling
these additional funds to investment. Various indicators for the extent of financial
depth exist, including the ratio of domestic credits to the private sector by banks
compared to GDP and the ratio of money and quasi money (M2) to GDP.
Admittedly, Tunisia has succeeded in improving its financial systems during
the past couple of years. From 1990–1999 to 2000–2009, the banks’ provision of
credit as measured by the credit-to-GDP ratio increased from 51% to 55% and the
M2-to-GDP ratio increased from 47% to 54% [World Bank, 2014a]. Recently, even
more progress has been made (see Table 3). Nevertheless, there is still a far way to
go. Small and medium-sized enterprises have difficulties in accessing credits from
banks [US DoS, 2014]. Although government regulations hold down lending
rates, non-interest costs for borrowing are high, including massive collateral re-
quirements. Apart from bank credits, other financing instruments are not much
used. While banks account for 90% of financing, stock market provides only 6 to
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7% of total corporate finance. The Bourse de Tunis lists only a few dozen compa-
nies. No bond market exists and private equity is a niche market only [US DoS,
2014].
Table 3. Financial sector indicators, Tunisia compared to selected country groups, 2012
Country group/country
Lower
middle
income
countries
Tunisia
Upper
middle
income
countries
High
income
OECD
members
GNI per capita 1,045–4,125 4,240 4,126–12,745 12,745
Indicator as % of GDP
Average gross domestic savings 23.2 15.1 33.0 19.0
Average gross capital formation 28.7 24.3 32.4 19.6
Domestic credit to private sector
by banks
39.3 72.1 88.1 97.7
Money and Quasi-Money (M2) 58.5 67.4 119.9 140.9
Foreign direct investment,
net inflows
2.1 3.4 3.1 1.5
Source: [World Bank, 2014a].
As long as these difficulties exist, an easier way to increase investment is by
capital imports. Of course, FDI is only one form of capital imports. It is not neces-
sarily a silver bullet nor has it actually been extensively used by all successful
catching-up economies. Korea, for instance, relied – in addition to domestic sav-
ings – on external credits during its high-growth period and FDI inflows have sel-
dom exceeded the threshold of 1% of GDP. China, on the other hand, embarked
on an explicitly FDI-backed growth strategy and used FDI to further increase its
already extraordinarily high investment ratio. Even in China, however, FDI has
always been a supplement to rather than a substitute for the country’s own en-
deavours. FDI inflows to China since the mid-1990s have never been larger than
4% of its GDP. Among the newly industrialising economies Malaysia is one of the
few exceptions with FDI inflows in comparison to GDP exceeding at least in some
years the 5%-ratio. In the case of Tunisia, however, in addition to bridging the gap
between the actual and the necessary investment rates, a significant advantage of
a FDI-based capital import strategy should not be overlooked: the potential contri-
bution to the improvement of the quality of economic growth.
2.2. Elaborating the complexity of the economic structure
Due to its impact on productivity, foreign direct investment is of higher rele-
vance for newly industrialising countries than short-term capital inflows (portfo-
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lio investment, credits). FDI is usually accompanied by an implicit transfer ofmore
advanced technologies, often supplemented by on-the-job vocational training.
Furthermore, foreign-funded enterprises may provide a benchmark for manage-
ment practices in local enterprises and thus encourage the transfer of up-to date
management know-how. As FDI is geared towards a long-term engagement, it
helps to insulate the capital provision from the vicissitudes of international financial
markets. When investing in infrastructure, FDI can serve as a substitute for inter-
nal capital formation without increasing government debts. Finally, competition
increases on the internal market of the host country – a fact which could contrib-
ute to optimising factor allocation.
FDI can also be instrumental in influencing the structure of the economy. The
impact of the structure of an economy on its overall growth can best be under-
stood by applying Hausmann’s complexity approach [Hausmann et al., 2011].
In this view, the complexity of an economy depends on two factors: directly on
the diversity of its products and inversely on their ubiquitousness. An economy
producing and exporting products which many other economies also produce
(i.e. ubiquitous products) cannot be considered to have highly specialised knowl-
edge which lays the foundation for future growth. On the other hand, an econ-
omy producing and exporting products which only few other countries can
produce is presumed to use highly sophisticated knowlethe uniqueness of the
export is not a result of the fact that the product is simply rarely found in other
countries. Therefore, it is necessary to simultaneously take into account the diver-
sity of a country’s export structure. The reason behind this is that producing only
one or a few unique products (such as a rare mineral) while not producing many
other products at the same time points to the fact that this economy lacks the
knowledge relevant for the production of highly sophisticated products.
Both dimensions are recorded by the economic complexity index ECI
[Hausmann et al., 2011]. Based on figures of 2008, Japan’s ECI value (+ 2.32) and
Germany’s (+ 1.99) were the highest. Both countries export many goods that can-
not be produced by many other countries – i.e. their exports are of low ubiquity or
high uniqueness. In addition, Japan and Germany produce and export many
other commodities. Thismeans that the lowubiquity of some of their export prod-
ucts cannot be supposed to be the result of rarity, but the result of the fact that
other economies are not able to produce them. Due to the advantage in terms of
knowledge endowment, Japan and Germany have a high growth potential in
a post-Heckscher/Ohlin-world, where competitive advantage is no longer gener-
ated by the labour and capital costs of a product but by its innovative content
(a fact which has been termed ‘Schumpeterian competition’). On the other hand,
countries with a low ECI value, such as Angola (-1.793) or Mauritania (-1.907), ex-
port a few products which are of relatively high ubiquity and which are usually
exported by countries that are not very diversified in their export structure.
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Using the 2008 value of the ECI as a yardstick, Tunisia displays the highest
economic complexity of all African economies: + 0.294. Its world-wide rank is 47,
compared to a rather low rank 80 as far as income per capita is concerned. Given
the globally increasing relevance of knowledge-based production, this divergence
indicates considerable and quick catching up potential for Tunisia.
The actual contribution of industry to the overall production, however, declined
even if slightly during the first decade of the new millennium: industry value
added as percentage of GDP dropped from 32% to 30% [World Bank, 2014a].
Manufacturing value added (MVA) grew on average annually by 3.6% in Tunisia
– well below the overall growth rate of the economy, and a fact pointing to an in-
sidious de-industrialisation.
Thus, Tunisia needs to be aware that the complexity of its economymay be de-
teriorating. By locating FDI to diversify the economy and upgrade its complexity,
Tunisian authorities can try to reverse this process. Is the Tunisian investment pol-
icy conducive for this task?
3. Policies
Different camps in economic policy advise different approaches to promote
economic diversification and growth in emerging economies. Basically, a market-
optimistic ‘functional approach’ and a state-optimistic ‘selective approach’ [Lall,
2000] can be discerned. While the functional approach seeks to strengthen the
working of institutions and markets and argues in favour of a general openness of
an economy, the selective approach seeks to directly influence the structure of an
economy. However, not only the impartiality of the administration, but also the
tools for a careful benefit-cost-analysis of selective interventions are indispensable
when applying this approach. In the situation of a catching-up industrialisation,
when many traits of the ‘future’ economy can be derived from the example of
more progressed economies, the argument can be made in favour of the selective
approach. Japan’s catching-up industrialisation in the 1950s to 1970s has often
been used as an example for this type of industrial policies. Given, however, the
fact that information is missing with respect to designing appropriate industrial
policies and to evaluating the benefits and costs of selective interventions, Tunisia
so far has rightly chosen to apply amixture of ‘functional’ and ‘selective’ industrial
policies.
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3.1. Present instruments
Tunisia’s promotional policies for foreign direct investment date back to the
1990s. The Investment Code (last version of 2009) has given priority to sectorswith
high employment potential and export-orientation. In view of the low level of
physical infrastructure and economic development in the western and southern
regions reducing regional economic disparities has been made an additional goal
[US DoS, 2014]. A further objective was the protection of local industrial develop-
ment cores in spite of a general open-doors policy towards capital imports. For
this purpose, investment was divided into two categories: ‘off shore’ investment,
with more than 70% of final production destined for exports, and ‘on shore’ in-
vestment, which to a substantial part aims at the internal market. Incentives for
these two categories have been very different. In addition, certain segments of the
economy have been discouraged or even exempted from foreign investment,
such as restaurants, real estate and the acquisition of agricultural land.
Investment incentives include [see: US DoS, 2014; RoT, 2014]: a tax exemption
for profits from investment in priority development areas, tax-free imports of raw
materials and an investment subsidy of 8–25% of the total value of the investment
(up to US$ 230,000 in general and US$ 715,000 in priority regional development
areas). In addition, the government will assume up to 16% of social security costs
for the first 7 to 10 years of the investment for the employment of new college
graduates. Training costs are also partly covered. Large investments with high job
creation potential may benefit from the free use of state-owned land. Additional
incentives are available to promote investment in designated regional investment
zones in economically depressed areas and in particular sectors, including health,
education, training, transportation, environmental protection, waste treatment
and R&D.
Presently, a new Investment Promotion Code is being formulated by the new
Tunisian government [World Bank, 2013]. Given the prevalent high structural un-
employment, Tunisia’s government will have to balance the impact of FDI on
technical progress and human capital formation with its impact on employment
creation. In addition, explicit risks for the economic and political stability of the
host country resulting from foreign direct investment should not be overlooked.
These stumbling blocks on the way to a full use of FDI for Tunisia’s economic de-
velopment will be discussed in the following section.
3.2. Stumbling blocks
FDI may aggravate social inequality in newly industrialising economies. Ad-
mittedly, this expectation contradicts the prediction of conventional two-factor
models of international trade that wages in labour-abundant developing coun-
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tries will increase following a free-trade induced specialisation of the economy on
labour-intensive products (Stolper–Samuelson factor price equalisation theorem).
However, Kremer and Maskin [2006] predicted a different outcome of economic
integration. They considered different types of labour (managing and operational
workforce in rich countries, skilled and unskilled in poor ones), i.e. a n-factor
model, as well as a deep integration into the world economy by shifting produc-
tion sites in addition to a shallow integration by trading commodities only. Their
model of internationalised production predicts only wages for high-skilled work-
ers in developing countries to be high and rising, while low-skilled workers’
wages will be stagnant (in agriculture, informal sector services and local crafts).
Basically, the effect of increasing inequality results from two sources: first, the
comparatively higher productivity of workers in foreign-funded enterprises as
they combine with the workforce and capital of the developed economies in
a global production network; second, a low supply of skilled workers from the
educational systems of developing countries. This combination explains the rela-
tively high price of skilled labour in developing countries. A further reason is that
demand for local products and hence for labour force in locally-funded enter-
prises tends to decrease as income increases (negative price elasticity of income).
FDI may result in a net creation of jobs – although generalisations should be
treated with caution, since less competitive but more labour-intensive local pro-
ducers can be crowded out. Also, foreign-funded enterprises may fail to establish
backward and forward linkages to the local economy, necessary for spillover ef-
fects to marginalised regions and traditional economic sectors. The reason is that
foreign-funded enterprises tend to import most of their inputs in order to guaran-
tee the high product quality necessary for the output to meet the quality require-
ments of global value chains. Further challenges for Tunisia will be to create a more
regionally balanced growth pattern and the securing of the natural resources for
future generations. A permanent adjustment and improvement of incentives, in-
frastructural preconditions and governance seem necessary [Ezzine, 2014].
Beyond FDI promotion, policies to improve ‘inclusiveness’ of growth will be
decisive for sustaining economic development. Although Tunisia seems to be on
the right track, there is still a far way to go [Wohlmuth, 2014]. Wohlmuth em-
phasises the ‘human’ dimensions of development (health, education) and em-
ployment creation. The creation of an environment conducive for the small and
medium-sized enterprises, i.e. the potential employment-generating growth en-
gines, the creation of the basic conditions for the absorption ofmodern technology
and effective government are seen to be instrumental for inclusive growth. Kap-
pel and Pfeiffer framed a catalogue of operational preconditions to assess the eco-
nomic development potential, which include structural transformation and
growth of total factor productivity, financial deepening, infrastructure develop-
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ment, education, institution building and openness. Also according to the index
elaborated from these criteria, Tunisia is among the few African economies which
showed some characteristics of the potential forwell-founded growth, scoring 18th
out of 106 developing countries around the world [Kappel, Pfeiffer, 2013].
Finally, given the strong economic ties between the Maghreb and the Euro-
zone, there have been negative spillovers from the Eurozone crisis [Bass, Stein-
beck, 2013]. And there is still a number of challenges beyond the economic sphere:
militant Islamist tendencies within the country cannot be neglected and cause in-
vestors to be reluctant. In addition, Tunisia’s neighbour Libya is on the brink of
a collapse of government authority if not an outright civil war, causing a substan-
tial refugee problem for Tunisia. To continue a path to economic prosperity, Tuni-
sia must insulate itself from any negative repercussions from the present political
unrest in the Middle East and North African region.
Conclusions
Tunisia looks back on a fifty-year history of integration into the world econ-
omy. The opening-up to FDI became relevant in the 1990s and capital inflow in-
creased until the onset of the recent crises. Despite a rather lenient regulation of
foreign business activity and the participation of foreign firms in the privatisation
process, the increase in inflows has lost momentum. This makes the case for an in-
crease in the promotional endeavours. One reason is that the countries’ low sav-
ings and investment rate need to be supplemented by capital imports. A second
reason lies in the contribution of FDI to improve the quality of economic growth.
In particular, FDI can be instrumental in maintaining an already relatively high
economic complexity in Tunisia. Given the prevalent high structural unemploy-
ment, however, the Tunisian government will have to balance the impact of FDI
on technical progress with its impact on employment creation. This may call for
a more selective approach to promotional policies.
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